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Abstract
Credit derivatives allow for buying protection on corporate debt, but also on sov-
ereign debt. In this paper we examine the implications for sovereign debt crises. We
show that the availability of credit protection lowers ex-ante debtor moral hazard
by allowing a bondholder to improve his bargaining position in negotiations with the
sovereign, thus forcing the sovereign to internalize more of the costs of a crisis. When
bondholders use credit protection strategically, we additionally nd that credit deriv-
atives do not hinder an e¢ cient resolution of crises. Crisis resolution may even be
improved by facilitating conditionality. When protection is not chosen strategically,
however, credit protection may also be detrimental to crisis resolution by making
restructuring more di¢ cult. In either case we identify a role for government policy
as bondholderschoice of protection is not necessarily socially e¢ cient.
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1 Introduction
The wave of defaults in countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Russia has led to a
renewed interest in sovereign debt crises in recent years. The resolution of these crises is
often di¢ cult because in the absence of supranational bankruptcy procedures, there is no
clear and orderly mechanism on how to deal with them. In principal, this absence could be
compensated for by writing appropriate contracts ex-ante. However, countries seem only
to a very limited extent able to do so. Because of these, and other issues, many observers
consider the current arrangements for resolving sovereign crises as ine¢ cient.1
The arrival of credit derivatives has added a new element to sovereign debt nancing.
Broadly speaking, credit derivatives are nancial instruments that allow creditors to insure
against losses on their debt.2 Their use is spreading rapidly: the total outstanding volume
of credit derivatives had reached U$ 54.6 trillion during 2008 and gross market values
have even been increasing during the crisis period.3 While most protection is traded for
corporates, a signicant part of the market covers sovereign debt, allowing, among others,
to buy protection on countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Colombia, Venezuela, South
Africa and the Philippines.4
Credit derivatives matter for sovereign debt crises because they change a bondholders
incentives to participate in a debt restructuring. A widespread concern is that they make
restructuring more di¢ cult since credit derivatives may provide investors with incentives
1Several proposals for their improvement are currently under discussion. For an overview, see Eichen-
green (2003).
2In their most common form, the credit default swap, they work as follows: a bondholder makes periodic
insurance payments to a protection seller; in return, when a default occurs, the protection seller makes a
compensation payment to the bondholder. For a detailed overview of the various forms of credit derivatives,
see Ki¤, Michaud and Mitchell (2003).
3See BIS (2008) and ISDA (2008).
4Credit derivatives have been partly blamed for causing the ongoing subprime crisis because they reduce
banksincentives to monitor borrowers. This issue is arguably less of a concern in the sovereign context
where bank monitoring is limited. For discussions of the policy issues raised specically by sovereign credit
derivatives see Ranciere (2001), Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003), Verdier (2004) and Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (2005).
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to hold out in the hope of forcing a default, thereby triggering a repayment under the
terms of the derivative contract5 and are thus harmful for the resolution of crises. An
alternative view would be that credit derivatives are benecial for crisis resolution since
they provide a new tool to structure debt relationships. In particular, credit derivatives
have been praised for their exibility since they allow a bondholder to choose the extent
and duration of protection he buys. Which of these views is likely to prevail, of course,
ultimately depends on how a bondholder will use protection.
This paper aims at understanding some of the consequences of the availability of credit
protection for sovereign debt crises. We present a simple model of sovereign debt nancing.
In this model, the optimal ex-post resolution of a crisis depends on a countrys produc-
tivity. While for su¢ ciently high productivity it is e¢ cient to restructure debt, a default
is preferable when countries are unproductive in order to avoid a continued ine¢ cient use
of resources. The equilibrium crisis resolution which arises in the absence of protection is
e¢ cient, except for private costs which a country su¤ers in a default. These costs create a
bias towards default, i.e., there are situations where a default occurs although restructur-
ing would be e¢ cient. From an ex-ante point of view, however, crisis resolution is always
ine¢ cient. This is because due to sovereign immunity the sovereign can renegotiate down
the debt claim in a crisis. This reduces the crisis costs borne by the country and causes
ex-ante debtor moral hazard in crisis avoidance.
We rst study the impact of credit protection chosen by a bondholder for strategic
reasons, that is in order to inuence his position in a potential crisis.6 Contrary to the
voiced concern, we nd that credit protection does not undermine the ability to achieve
restructuring. It is true that if the bondholder would su¢ ciently insure his bonds, restruc-
5Anne Krueger, the deputy managing director of the IMF, in a recent speech (Krueger, 2002).
6For dispersed debt, this requires the existence of bondholders that have potential inuence over the
overall restructuring process. For instance, for restructuring through the London Club (which deals with
commercial bank debt) these may be members of the steering committee which handles negotiations with
the sovereign. For non-commercial private debt, large creditors have an inuence over the restructuring
process through the consultation period which typically precedes the public exchange o¤er (this may be
either formally, as notably in Uruguay and the Dominican Republic in recent years, or informally).
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turing would indeed be impossible as the bondholder then always prefers default in order
to trigger the protection. However, choosing such protection is not in the bondholders
interest. The reason is that the bondholder would then exercise protection in every crisis,
making the purchase of protection expensive.7 Still, there are welfare ramications as the
bondholder insures partially in order to improve the restructuring o¤er the sovereign has
to make. This has the e¤ect of reducing ex-ante debtor moral hazard by making crises
more costly for the country.8
We further study situations in which the strategic bondholder has inferior knowledge
about the repayment ability of the country. In the absence of protection, this has the
consequence that crisis resolution cannot be conditional on the countrys productivity, as
the sovereign always has an incentive to pretend to have high productivity. We show that
there is a role for credit protection in restoring conditionality, which arises because it can
alter the bondholders incentives to litigate against the sovereign in a default.
Next we analyze the case where protection is bought non-strategically, that is without
taking into account its potential e¤ect on the resolution of crisis. This case is of interest
if there are many bondholders, of which each is not large enough to perceive an inuence
over the restructuring outcome. In this case, multiple equilibria arise. Credit protection is
still benecial by lowering ex-ante moral hazard but may now be detrimental by causing
ine¢ cient defaults ex-post since bondholders may buy more protection than what is socially
optimal. However, if creditors can coordinate on equilibria which are not pareto-dominated,
negative e¤ects of credit protection can always be fully avoided.
7The seller of protection is assumed not to enter the (pre-default) renegotiation between the sovereign
and the bondholders. This is typically a contractual requirement of CDS contracts (see INSOL, 2006).
8This argument is related to studies that argue against policy interventions that make restructuring less
costly for sovereigns. Dooley (2000) and Shleifer (2003), for example, have shown that such interventions
increase sovereignsincentives to repudiate their debt. Given that creditors have little enforcement power,
they will be more reluctant to lend. This then leads to higher costs of borrowing for sovereigns and a
reduction in lending to emerging market countries (see also Eichengreen, 2003, and Bolton and Jeanne,
2005).
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Summing up, our results broadly suggest that credit derivatives are benecial for sov-
ereign debt nancing from an ex-ante perspective. This is because protection allows a
bondholder to improve his outside option in a crisis. The increased outside option neutral-
izes the renegotiation problem which arises from sovereign immunity and reduces debtor
moral hazard. The desirability of credit derivatives from an ex-post crisis resolution per-
spective is ambiguous and depends crucially on whether protection is bought strategically
or not. In the latter case, there is a strong role for governments and international orga-
nization in coordinating on desirable equilibria that avoid that too muchprotection is
bought.
However, even in the case where protection is chosen strategically, equilibrium protec-
tion is not always socially optimal in terms of crisis resolution. In particular, the excessive
defaults that arise from countriesprivate costs could be fully avoided by buying protec-
tion with a su¢ ciently long maturity. Intuitively, this is because under such protection the
bondholder is more inclined to accept a restructuring o¤er, as he is then also protected
against situations where the country cannot make the repayments on the restructured bond
in the future. This suggests that if debtor countries and/or supranational institutions be-
lieve that the current restructuring procedure exhibits a bias towards delivering defaults,
they can correct this bias through the appropriate use of credit derivatives. This may for
example take the form of protection that is attached to the initial bond and guaranteed
by a third party.
Credit derivatives may thus have a role to play in the ongoing discussion on how to
improve the sovereign restructuring process. In fact, by increasing the negotiation power
of creditors in a crisis, they work in a similar way as proposals that aim at enhancing cred-
itor power, such as a bankruptcy court for sovereign debt (Krueger, 2002, and Bolton and
Jeanne, 2005) or measures to increase the contractibility of debtors payo¤s (Tirole, 2002,
and Ghosal and Miller, 2003). Moreover, their ability to reduce informational problems
between lenders and borrowers may reduce the need for institutions that aggregate infor-
mation, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (as analyzed in Spiegel, 2005).
Furthermore, because they allow for a private sector solution for ine¢ cient defaults, they
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may be an alternative to IMF-bailouts or insurance funds (as suggested by Jeanne, 2001).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briey reviews
related literature on credit derivatives. Section 3 presents the basic model in the absence
of protection. Section 4 studies the impact of protection that is strategically chosen.
Section 5 extends the analysis to situations where the strategic bondholder is not fully
informed about the repayment ability of the country. Section 6 rst analyzes the case
where protection is not chosen strategically. It also discusses several extensions, such as
allowing for coordination problem among bondholders in a restructuring process and for
bailouts by the IMF. The nal section concludes.
2 Credit Derivatives in the Literature
Many contributions to the burgeoning literature on credit derivatives have focused on their
impact on the borrower-lender relationship. Du¤ee and Zhou (2001), for example, show
how the exibility of credit derivative instruments can be used to mitigate adverse selection
problems. Morrison (2005) has shown that credit derivative markets can reduce banks
incentives to monitor, which can erode the certication value of bank loans. In Chiesa
(2008) bank monitoring is improved by credit derivatives, as they allow for transferring the
informationally least sensitive part of the credit risk.
The point of departure for our paper is Arping (2005), who has shown in the context of
corporate debt that credit protection can improve lendersoutside option and thus exercise
a disciplining e¤ect on borrowers. Our paper deviates from Arpings in several respects.
For one, we additionally consider the impact of credit protection on the resolution of a
crisis and how this trades o¤ with the bondholders desire to increase his outside option.
While in Arpings model default is always ine¢ cient and never occurs in equilibrium, in
our model the e¢ ciency of crisis resolution varies with the countrys productivity and
equilibrium credit protection may alter crisis resolution.9
9One consequence of this, for example, is that (in contrast to Arping) debtor moral hazard may actually
increase after the introduction of credit protection because credit protection is used to improve crisis
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Furthermore, we also allow for situations in which lenders are imperfectly informed
about the borrowers repayment abilities. We also acknowledge that it is relatively costly
for lenders to legally enforce any claims when a sovereign defaults. This friction turns out to
play an important role for the impact of credit protection, in particular it allows protection
to reduce ine¢ ciencies in crisis resolution stemming from lenders inferior information.
Moreover, consistent with the nature of credit derivatives markets we analyze protection
that is chosen anonymously, while Arpings paper mostly focuses on protection that is part
of the contract between lenders and borrowers. As a consequence, the equilibrium level
of protection is not necessarily socially e¢ cient in our paper, and we consider the role for
government policy to improve e¢ ciency.10 Finally, we also consider protection that is not
chosen strategically.
Only a few papers have so far focused on sovereign debt markets. General overviews
are provided in Ranciere (2001), Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003), and Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (2005). Verdier (2004) provides an extensive analysis of the legal aspects,
which played a large role in recent settlements of protection. Pan and Singleton (2005)
and Cossin and Jung (2005) use sovereign credit derivatives to extract market expectations
about sovereign risk.
3 A Simple Model of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
in the Absence of Credit Protection
Consider a sovereign country and a bondholder, who are both risk-neutral and maximize
their expected payo¤s. There are three periods and there is no discounting. In period 0,
the sovereign borrows funds from the bondholder and invests them fully in a project that
generates output f in period 2. Repayment takes place in period 1 and in period 2. The
resolution (see, for example, Proposition 6).
10For most parts our analysis also applies to corporate debt. However, we have chosen to focus our
exposition on sovereigns because due to sovereign immunity the renegotiation problem is presumably more
severe in this context.
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total repayment is normalized to one.
At the beginning of period 1, the sovereign nds himself without any funds. However,
he can undertake an e¤ort to raise the funds necessary for full repayment. Raising these
funds incurs costs a, for example, because it increases the domestic tax burden. The costs
are drawn from an interval [amin; amax] with a density (a) that has full support on this
interval (i.e., (a) > 0 for a 2 [amin; amax]). The costs are known to the sovereign when he
makes his e¤ort decision. If the sovereign decides to exert e¤ort, the crisis can be avoided,
which brings benets b > 0 to the country. If the sovereign does not exert the e¤ort, the
funds remain zero and he faces default.
In order to avoid default, he can make a take-it-or-leave-it restructuring o¤er to the
bondholder.11 ;12 A restructuring o¤er promises a period 2 return in exchange for the total
outstanding debt. If the bondholder accepts (i.e., the o¤er is successful), production in
the project continues, yielding output f in period 2. If the bondholder rejects, the country
is in default (equivalently, in such cases the sovereign could default outright rather than
making a restructuring o¤er).13 The project can then no longer be continued (for example,
because it requires foreign resources which are unavailable in a default). The bondholder
then obtains the liquidation value of the project k, with k < 1 (in Section 5.1 we consider
that the bondholder has to litigate in order to obtain k).14 The disruption of the project
11Such pre-default restructuring has become common since the mid 1990s.
12We focus here on the extreme case where the sovereign has all the bargaining power. For our arguments
to hold, however, it is only needed that the sovereign has some bargaining power.
13Our model abstracts from strategic holdouts. In a world of multiple creditors, this presumes that there
is some form of creditor coordination such as through collection action clauses (CAC), creditor committees,
or restructuring via the London or the Paris Club (recent restructuring experiences also suggest that the
holdout problem is perhaps overstated; see for example De Brun and Della Mea (2003) who show that
in the Uruguay case restructuring was implemented within a short time on debt which did not include
CACs).
14The assumption that the bondholder obtains the liquidation value in full may seem extreme; however,
our main results hold also when the bondholder can only secure a fraction of the countrys funds. Fur-
thermore, it should be noted that the possibilities for creditors to enforce their claims against sovereigns
have improved substantially recently as bondholders can now threaten to disrupt future nancing: in 2000
Elliott Associates succeeded in stopping the distribution of Perus payments to new bondholders, forcing
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causes additional private default costs c > 0 to the country, such as from lower domestic
consumption.15
3.1 Sovereign Debt Crises and Welfare
In this section we discuss the welfare aspects of our model. The formal derivations can be
found in Appendix 1.
In recent models of sovereign debt nancing, it has become standard to dene welfare
in terms of ex-post e¢ ciency and ex-ante e¢ ciency16. Ex-post e¢ ciency relates to the
extent to which sovereign debt crises are e¢ ciently resolved once they occur. The severe
output losses during recent crisis episodes are often perceived as ine¢ cient and several
proposals have been put forward on how to facilitate a less costly resolution of debt crises.17
These proposals are based on the notion that the output losses represent a deadweight loss.
E¢ ciency in that view thus requires that, once a crisis occurs, the joint payo¤s of sovereign
and bondholder are maximized. In our model, this implies that there is restructuring
whenever the output of the project is at least its liquidation value net of default costs (i.e.,
f  k   c), and default otherwise.18 Appendix 1 shows formally that this maximizes ex-
post welfare.19 Thus, we can evaluate the ex-post welfare implications of credit protection
Peru to pay Elliotts pre-Brady loans in full.
15More broadly, these default costs can also be interpreted as being due to reputational losses (e.g.,
Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) or sanctions (e.g., Bulow and Rogo¤, 1989). Note that these costs are on top
of the benets b that are lost if the country undergoes a crisis per se. The latter are costs such as from
negotiating with the bondholders and/or restructuring the bond, or may be costs due to a (temporary)
exclusion from capital markets during negotiations.
16See for example Dooley (2000), Gai et al. (2004) and Ghosal and Miller (2003).
17The two most important proposals in recent years have been the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mech-
anism (SDRM) advocated by the IMF and the use of collective action clauses, recommended by the US
Treasury. While the SDRM has not been implemented, the use of collective action clauses is now standard
in international sovereign bond markets (IMF, 2006, Gelpern and Gulati, forthcoming 2007).
18An alternative interpretation of the optimality of default when output is low is that the country can
carry out a reform which increases the productivity of the project but may choose not to do so under
restructuring because of the outstanding debt (debt overhang problem).
19The distribution of the payo¤s between sovereign and bondholder does not a¤ect ex-post e¢ ciency as
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by looking at its e¤ect on the joint payo¤s of sovereign and bondholder in a crisis.
Ex-ante e¢ ciency relates to whether sovereigns have su¢ cient incentives to avoid debt
crises and to repay their debt. If crises are not costly for sovereigns, a moral hazard problem
arises in that sovereigns have no incentive to undertake the e¤ort it takes to prevent debt
crises from occurring in the rst place. In this view, the costs that sovereigns incur during
debt crises are necessary to provide sovereigns with an incentive to repay their debt (see,
e.g., Dooley 2000). In our analysis below, we follow Dooley (2000) and others (Gai et
al. (2004) and Ghosal and Miller (2003)) and evaluate the ex-ante welfare implications of
credit protection by looking at its e¤ect on the sovereigns payo¤ in a crisis. Appendix 1
shows that welfare in fact decreases with the sovereigns payo¤ in a crisis.
The reason is the following. Since a share of the crisis costs is borne by the bondholder,
the sovereign has a tendency to underprovide e¤ort from a welfare perspective, that is
there are e¤ort costs a for which the sovereign does not undertake e¤ort, even if it would
be socially optimal to do so. If the sovereign is now made to participate more in the costs
of a crisis, his crisis payo¤s relative to the payo¤s if there is no crisis decline. This improves
his incentives to exert e¤ort. Welfare increases as a result, since there are then more states
of the world (that is, more realizations of e¤ort costs a) for which e¤ort is undertaken.
Summarizing, welfare in our model increases with the joint payo¤s of sovereign and
bondholder in a crisis and decreases with the sovereigns payo¤ in a crisis.20 Note that,
hence, in order to study welfare in our setup, it entirely su¢ ces to determine the payo¤s
to both parties in a crisis. The reason is that ex-post payo¤s, besides obviously determin-
ing ex-post e¢ ciency, also determine ex-ante e¢ ciency because the latter depend on the
sovereigns payo¤ in a crisis. Thus, in the following we directly study crisis outcomes, that
is situations where the sovereign decides not to undertake e¤ort.
in competitive bond markets the sovereign participates fully in the bondholders losses in a crisis through
a higher interest rate.
20The arising potential friction between ex-post e¢ ciency of crisis resolution and ex-ante incentives is
now central to the sovereign restructuring debate. See Bolton and Jeanne (2005) for a recent example.
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3.2 Equilibrium Crisis Resolution
Table 1, column No protection, summarizes for a restructuring o¤er of r the crisis payo¤s
(that is, when the sovereign does not exert e¤ort) for the sovereign and the bondholder.
Because there is no discounting, we can ignore whether payments are received in period 1
or 2. When the o¤er is accepted, the bondholders payo¤ is r, or f whenever the projects
output falls short of r. The sovereign obtains whatever there may be left of output after
having paid the bondholder: max(f   r; 0). When the o¤er is rejected, the bondholder
obtains the liquidation value k and the sovereign su¤ers default costs  c.
Table 1: Payo¤s for a Restructuring O¤er r
No protection Short protection q Long protection q
Sovereign Accept max(f   r; 0) max(f   r; 0) max(f   r; 0)
Reject  c  c  c
Bondholder Accept min(r; f) min(r; f)
if r  f : r
if r > f : q + (1  q)f
Reject k q + (1  q)k q + (1  q)k
Proposition 1 derives the equilibrium outcome of the restructuring process, which is
also summarized in Table 2 (column No protection).
Proposition 1 In the absence of protection there is restructuring with r = k whenever
f  k and default otherwise.
Proof. Note rst that the sovereigns payo¤ under restructuring (max(f   r; 0)  0) is
larger than under default ( c < 0). Thus the sovereign always prefers restructuring. Given
that the bondholders payo¤ under default is k, the sovereign needs to credibly promise a
return of k to obtain restructuring. When f  k, this is feasible by o¤ering r = k and hence
there is restructuring with r = k. When f < k, the sovereign cannot credibly promise a
return which is at least equal to the bondholders payo¤ under default (in particular, r > f
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is not credible; the bondholder realizes then that his payo¤ will only be f). Any restructuring
o¤er is hence rejected and there is default.
Table 2: Equilibrium Crisis Resolution (R=Restructuring, D=Default)
No protection Protection
f  k f < k f  k f < k
Resolution of Crisis R with r = k D R with r = f D
Sovereigns Payo¤ f   k  c 0  c
Bondholders Payo¤ k k f k
Crisis resolution is thus e¢ cient, except when we have k > f > k   c. In this case,
there is default (as f < k) but the sovereigns and bondholders joint payo¤ would be
higher under restructuring (as f > k   c). The reason why the sovereign cannot achieve
restructuring in this case (even though he would like to because of private costs c) is that
he cannot credibly promise a return at least equal to the bondholders outside option k.
The proposition also shows that moral hazard in crisis avoidance is not minimized because
the sovereign can keep f   r = f   k  0 when there is restructuring, even though the
bondholder is not fully repaid (r = k < 1).21 This is because, once in a crisis, the sovereign
renegotiates down the bondholders claim according to the bondholders outside option k
(in contrast, when there is no crisis, the sovereign does not nd it optimal to renegotiate
because of the costs of doing so, see Appendix 1).
4 Credit Protection
We now allow the bondholder to buy protection on his debt. As with standard credit
derivatives (such as credit default swaps), this protection insures the bondholder against
21Our analysis focuses on the moral hazard aspect of sovereign debt crisis and thus ignores liquidity
crises. These can be avoided in our setup because the sovereign can promise future output to bondholders
(for a recent synthesis of both views, see Powell and Arozamena, 2003).
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a so-called credit event. A credit event is dened as a situation where the debtor no
longer makes the agreed repayments to the bondholder and where the bondholder has not
voluntarily accepted a change in the repayment terms. Since the restructuring o¤er in our
model is accepted on a voluntary basis, it does not qualify as a credit event.22 However,
when the debtor does not deliver on the restructured debt, a credit event may still be
triggered, if the non-delivery falls within the period for which protection has been bought.
When a credit event occurs, the bondholder is paid q  1 = q by the protection seller,
where q (0  q  1) is the fraction of debt on which the bondholder buys protection.
Interpreting the debt as consisting of a (large) number of bonds, we can also refer to q as
the fraction of insured bonds. In return, the bondholder delivers the insured bonds to the
protection seller (such physical settlement is predominant for sovereign credit derivatives,
see Ranciere, 2001). We consider two di¤erent maturities of credit protection. Under short
(maturity) protection, the bondholder is only insured throughout period 1, while under long
(maturity) protection the bondholder is also insured throughout period 2. Thus, in contrast
to short protection, long protection also insures the bondholder against non-delivery on
the restructured bonds.23
We consider protection that is bought once the crisis has materialized (although, as will
become clear later, this assumption is inessential). We assume that the protection seller is
a risk neutral agent who behaves competitively. This implies that the price of protection,
p(q), equals the expected payments the protection seller has to make to the bondholder,
net of the value of the restructured bonds he may obtain. Note, furthermore, that the
protection seller can be ignored in the welfare analysis, as he breaks even on average.
We assume that the protection seller does not renegotiate his position before default (for
example, the protection seller could o¤er payments to the bondholder in order to make him
22This is consistent with the ruling of the Southern District of New York that Argentinas 2001 voluntary
exchange o¤er did not constitute a credit event (Verdier, 2004).
23Such di¤erences in maturities proved relevant during the Argentinian default: on November 1, 2001,
Argentina made a voluntary exchange o¤er, which was announced as successful on November 19. On
December 24, Argentina suspended payments on its debt, which triggered many default swaps. However,
some protection had expired between those dates (Verdier, 2004).
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accept a restructuring o¤er). This is a typical requirement of CDS contracts. The INSOL
(2006) documents that A protection seller is also usually unable, under the terms of a CDS,
to direct a protection buyer during a restructuring as to how to exercise its rights in respect
of any obligation of the debtor (before any physical settlement takes place).There are also
practical obstacles to renegotiation. A single protection seller would lack the incentives
(and probably also the means) to compensate the sovereign or the bondholder in order to
avoid default. A successful renegotiation for protection sellers (i.e., a renegotiation that
avoids default) would hence require for their actions to be coordinated. However, credit
derivatives are traded in decentralized markets and the ultimate sellers of protection are
likely to be widely dispersed (even though the bondholder may originally buy protection
from a single source, this source may not hold on to his position and make o¤setting trades
in CDS). Moreover, due to the anonymous nature of CDS markets, the ultimate holders of
protection are not easily identiable.
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 summarize the crisis payo¤s for a level q of either short
or long protection. For comparability with the no protection case, the table presents gross
payo¤s for the bondholder, which do not include the price of protection p (the protection
price, however, does not a¤ect the resolution process as it is sunk at the time of the
restructuring o¤er). There are two changes relative to the situation without protection.
First, under both short and long protection the bondholders payo¤ in a default is now
q + (1   q)k, which is larger than k when q > 0. This is because default constitutes
a credit event, allowing the bondholder to secure fully the nominal repayment on his
uninsured bonds (q  1). On the uninsured bonds, the bondholder receives their share in
the liquidation value ((1  q)k) (the remainder of the liquidation value (qk) is received by
the protection seller as he obtains the insured bonds from the bondholder). Second, under
long protection the bondholders payo¤ if the sovereign does not deliver on the restructured
bond is q + (1  q)f , as he can then still exercise protection in period 2.
Proposition 2 derives the equilibrium crisis resolution which arises from the bond-
holders optimal choice of protection (also summarized in Table 2). Note that since the
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bondholder is risk neutral, he only buys protection for strategic reasons, that is in order
to improve his outside option in negotiations with the sovereign.
Proposition 2 The introduction of protection does not change crisis resolution but reduces
moral hazard in crisis avoidance; in particular there is restructuring with r = f whenever
f  k and default otherwise.
Proof. Suppose that the bondholder buys an amount of short protection q such that
his payo¤ under default becomes q+(1  q)k = f (i.e., q = (f   k)=(1  k)) when f  k
and buys no protection (q = 0) otherwise. When f  k, there is thus acceptance with r =
q + (1   q)k = f , as the sovereign still always prefers acceptance and has to promise at
least the bondholders default payo¤ to obtain restructuring. The bondholders net payo¤
(net of the price of protection) is then f since the price of protection is zero as protection
is not exercised. When f < k, Proposition 1 can be readily applied as q = 0, implying
that there is rejection and the bondholders payo¤ is then k. It follows that for each f the
bondholder obtains the maximum available payo¤: f when f  k and k when f < k. q is
therefore the bondholders optimal protection (other forms of protection may at most give
the same payo¤ ). Since for q there is restructuring when f  k and default otherwise, we
have that equilibrium crisis resolution is unchanged. However, the sovereigns payo¤ when
f  k is now zero (when f < k it is still  c). Hence, for f > k moral hazard is lowered.
Thus, even though credit protection can potentially reduce the e¢ ciency of restructur-
ing (as protection may raise the bondholders outside option, q+ (1  q)k , beyond f even
when f > k and thus lead to ine¢ cient defaults), it is not in the bondholders interest to
choose such levels of protection. This is because, since the protection seller breaks even,
the bondholders net payo¤ (i.e., net of the price of protection) always equals the payout
of the sovereign to both bondholder and protection seller in a crisis. In particular, the
bondholder fully internalizes a lower payo¤ for the protection seller via a higher price of
protection ex-ante. Obtaining protection which causes default when f > k is therefore not
optimal, as the total payout the sovereign makes in a default is only k, while the bond-
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holder through protection which does not lead to default can extract up to f from the
sovereign. Hence, even though the bondholders gross payo¤ in a default may be larger
than under restructuring (for q = 1 the bondholder could even fully recover his debt), the
bondholders net payo¤ is smaller.
As the proposition has shown, the availability of protection is even benecial for welfare
because it improves ex-ante debtor incentives. This is because it allows the bondholder to
increase his outside option in restructuring negotiations and thus reduces the sovereigns
payo¤ in a crisis.24 The question arises as to whether the bondholders choice of protection
is even welfare optimal. As the next proposition shows, this is not the case from the
perspective of ex-post crisis resolution.
Proposition 3 The bondholders choice of protection is not always socially optimal in
terms of crisis resolution. Crisis resolution can then be improved through appropriate short
and long protection; however, this comes at the cost of increased moral hazard.
Proof. Suppose that when f < 1 the bondholder holds long protection with qLP =
c=(1  f) and short protection with qSP =  c=(1  f) (note that although qSP < 0, qSP +
qLP  0 is still fullled). As qLP =  qSP , the bondholder is not protected in period 1
(e¤ectively, there is now protection which only starts in period 2). Compared to the case of
no protection, the bondholders payo¤ has only changed in that under restructuring he now
obtains qLP + (1  qLP )f = f + c when r > f . Analogous to Proposition 1, it follows that
there is restructuring with r = k whenever f + c  k and default otherwise, implying that
crisis resolution is now e¢ cient (when f  1 crisis resolution has already been e¢ cient
in the absence of protection). However, the sovereigns payo¤ (and thus moral hazard)
increases compared to the bondholders optimal protection. This is because the joint payo¤s
for the sovereign and the bondholder have increased (as crisis resolution becomes more
24We have assumed that the bondholder can fully obtain the liquidation value of the project. If this were
not the case, the renegotiation problem in the absence of protection would be more pronounced, making
the e¤ect of credit derivatives in terms of improving the bondholders outside option even stronger. Note
also that while reducing renegotiation is unambiguously benecial in our model, there are also arguments
for why this may be costly (see, for example, Weinschelbaum and Wynne, 2005).
15
e¢ cient and recalling that the protection seller breaks even) but the bondholders payo¤ has
not increased (otherwise, the bondholders optimal protection q from Proposition 2 would
not maximize his payo¤s).
Thus, there is a potential case for intervention. The reason why the bondholder does
not choose protection which achieves optimal resolution is that when k > f > k   c the
payout the sovereign makes to the bondholder and the protection seller under default (k)
is larger than the maximum attainable payout under restructuring (f).25
5 Informational Problems
An e¢ cient resolution of crises is likely to be complicated in practice because a sovereign
may have superior information about its repayment ability, that is the productivity of the
project. The bondholder does not then know whether the sovereign will be able to deliver
on the restructuring o¤er, which the sovereign may use to his advantage.
We assume now that there are two states of nature, high and low, occurring with
positive probabilities  and 1   , respectively. These states materialize at the time of
the crisis in period 1. Output of the project in the high state is fH > k, while in the low
state output is fL < k  c. An e¢ cient crisis resolution would thus require restructuring in
the high state and default in the low state. The sovereigns informational advantage arises
because he is assumed to have full knowledge of the states in a crisis, while the bondholder
only knows their prior probabilities.
Lemma 1 Equilibrium crisis resolution cannot be conditional on the state of the project
(no separating equilibria).
Proof. Suppose that there were a separating equilibrium, where without loss of gener-
ality the sovereign o¤ers rL in the low state and rH in the high state with rL 6= rH . The
25Proposition 3 also suggests that credit protection can overcome the ine¢ ciencies which arise because
the sovereigns default costs are private. Thus, credit derivatives may be a substitute for policies which
aim at increasing the pledgeable income of sovereigns (e.g., Tirole, 2002, and Ghosal and Miller, 2003).
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bondholder then learns about the state of the project from the o¤er, implying that there are
no informational problems. It follows from Proposition 1 that in the low state there is de-
fault and the sovereigns payo¤ is  c < 0, while in the high state there is restructuring and
the sovereigns payo¤ is at least zero. The sovereign could then strictly improve his payo¤
by o¤ering rH in the low state and thus achieve restructuring. Therefore, a separating
equilibrium cannot exist.
Lemma 1 holds because in a separating equilibrium the sovereign always has an incentive
to pretend to be in the high state. Therefore, there can only be pooling equilibria, in which
the sovereign makes a restructuring o¤er which is independent of the state. Proposition 4
derives the equilibrium crisis resolution in the absence of protection, where for convenience
we dene with ef := fH + (1   )fL the (prior) expected value of output and withgmin(r; f) := min(r; fH) + (1   )min(r; fL) the expected repayment on a restructuring
o¤er r.
Proposition 4 In the absence of protection there is restructuring with r such thatgmin(r; f) =
k whenever ef  k and default otherwise.
Proof. Analogous to Proposition 1: the sovereign still always prefers restructuring,
while the bondholder needs a repayment fullling gmin(r; f) = k to accept. For ef  k a
restructuring o¤er that guarantees such a repayment is feasible as then for r = fH we have
that gmin(fH ; f) = ef  k, while for ef < k it is not.
Note that there are now two types of ine¢ ciencies in the crisis resolution. First, there
are only pooling equilibria, while an e¢ cient outcome requires conditional crisis resolution
(i.e., restructuring in the high state and default in the low state). Second, the equilibrium
crisis resolution is ine¢ cient even within the class of pooling equilibria. This ine¢ ciency is
similar to the one obtained when informational problems are absent: when k > ef > k   c
there is default (since ef < k) although the joint expected payo¤ under restructuring is
higher (since ef > k   c).
The next proposition shows that the impact of credit protection is as in the absence of
informational problems:
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Proposition 5 The introduction of protection does not change crisis resolution but reduces
moral hazard; in particular there is restructuring with r = fH whenever ef  k and default
otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Similar to the previous section, the ine¢ cient default equilibrium which arises for k >ef > k   c can be avoided through a di¤erent choice of protection:
Proposition 6 The bondholders choice of protection is not always socially optimal in
terms of crisis resolution. Crisis resolution can then be improved through appropriate short
and long protection; however, this comes at the cost of increased moral hazard.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
5.1 Costly Litigation
In the following we show that there is also a role for credit protection in overcoming the rst
ine¢ ciency, that is to achieve conditionality in crisis resolution. This role arises when there
are imperfections which make obtaining the liquidation value costly for the bondholder,
for example because of legal fees.26 To this end we assume that in order to force the
government to pay out the liquidation value in a default, the bondholder would need to
engage in litigation which incurs costs l > 0. Consequently, the bondholder nds it optimal
to litigate only if (1   q)k  l, that is if his share in the liquidation value (arising from
the unprotected bonds) exceeds the litigation costs. We assume that in the absence of
protection the bondholder would litigate, i.e., k  l. We also assume that litigation merely
acts as a threat: whenever (1   q)k  l (i.e., the bondholder nds it optimal to litigate),
the sovereign prefers to avoid being litigated by paying right away. However, when this
condition is not fullled the sovereign can keep the liquidation value, as he knows that the
bondholder will not litigate. We presume that the protection seller remains passive in that
26Such litigation costs have, for example, been emphasized in Haldane et. al. (2005). Interestingly, in
our analysis, litigation costs can be welfare improving, as in their absence crisis resolution may not be
conditional.
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he does not litigate for his share in the liquidation value, which may be because his claim
is not large enough to justify incurring the legal fees (at the end of this section we discuss
the case for when the protection seller litigates).27
The next lemma shows that there are now situations in which credit protection can
achieve conditional crisis resolution. The reason is that credit protection reduces the bond-
holders benets from litigation and thus may render the litigation threat not credible. As
a consequence, the sovereign may keep the liquidation value in a default, which reduces his
incentives to pretend to be in the high state in order to obtain restructuring.
Lemma 2 When litigation is costly, credit protection may lead to conditional crisis reso-
lution.
Proof. Consider short protection q that fullls (i) (1   q)k < l and (ii) fL  q 
fH   (k   c) and assume moreover (iii) k   c > 0 ((i)-(ii) are, for instance, fullled for
q = 1 and fH  1+(k c)). From (i) we know that litigation is not credible. The sovereign
can therefore keep the capital stock in a default, making his default payo¤ k c. In order to
obtain acceptance in a separating equilibrium the sovereign has to credibly o¤er r = q as the
bondholders gross payo¤ under default is now only q (since he no longer obtains a share in
the liquidation value). The sovereigns payo¤ from restructuring is hencemax(fL q; 0) = 0
in the low state and max(fH   q; 0) = fH   q  k   c in the high state (from (ii)). It
follows that the sovereign prefers to default in the low state but to have restructuring in the
high state.
We show next that there are also situations in which the bondholder does indeed nd
it optimal to choose a level of protection which achieves conditionality.
Proposition 7 The introduction of protection may lead to conditional crisis resolution in
the presence of litigation costs.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
27Note that while contractual features typically preclude the protection seller to get involved in the
restructuring pre-default, after default he has under physical delivery in principal the same position as an
original bondholder.
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However, as the next proposition shows, there are also situations where the bondholder
does not choose protection that leads to conditionality, even if this is feasible and also
socially desirable in terms of crisis resolution. Intuitively, this is because conditional crisis
resolution only arises for levels of protection that render the litigation threat uncredible.
The resulting loss of the liquidation value for the bondholder may outweigh the additional
payo¤s the bondholder may achieve due to the improved crisis resolution. The bondholders
choice of protection is therefore not necessarily e¢ cient, creating a role for intervention.
Proposition 8 The bondholder may not choose a level of protection that leads to condi-
tional crisis resolution even when this is socially desirable in terms of crisis resolution.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Throughout this section we have assumed that the protection seller does not litigate
himself. This seems plausible as long as the degree of protection is not very high: the
protection sellers incentives to litigate are then limited as he only receives the insured part
of the bonds in a default. Nevertheless, for large levels of protection he may nd it optimal
to litigate. This may be particularly relevant for protection sellers that have low litigation
costs, which presumably is the case for vulture funds. Such funds are specialized in litigation
and may also be less concerned about reputational issues, such as adverse implications for
the relationship with sovereign lenders.28 However, while complicating the analysis, this
does not change the role of protection in achieving conditionality. This is because regardless
of whether or not the protection seller litigates, the sovereign can keep the bondholders
share in the liquidation value in a default when bondholder litigation becomes uncredible
(i.e., for (1  q)k < l). Therefore, sovereigns incentives to seek restructuring are reduced
compared to the situation without protection.
28Low litigation costs for protection sellers suggest another role for protection: when litigation costs
are so high that the bondholders litigation threat is not credible in the absence of protection (k < l),
protection may be used to make the litigation threat credible by transferring litigation to a more e¤ective
party (the protection seller). Credit derivatives, viewed in this way, can be e¢ ciency improving by allowing
for the sharing of tasks between the bondholder (with a comparative advantage in investing in bonds) and
the protection seller (with an advantage in litigation).
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6 Discussion and Extensions
In this section we extend the analysis to situations in which there are no strategic investors
(6.1), there is a higher number of possible output realizations (6.2), there is a coordination
problem among bondholders (6.3), or there is a possible bailout by the IMF (6.4).
6.1 No Strategic Investors
A crucial assumption in our analysis so far is the presence of strategic investors who have
an inuence in the restructuring process. Such investors can be members of the creditor
committee (or in the absence of a formal creditor committee, players who are likely to be
involved in the consultation period that typically precedes a formal restructuring o¤er) or
for example the lead bank that was underwriting the bond issuance. In the following we
consider the case where there are no strategic investors.
We assume that, rather than having a single bondholder, there is a continuum of bond-
holders. These bondholders take the overall restructuring outcome and the price of pro-
tection as given. As before, we assume that the price of protection equals the expected
payments the protection seller has to make to a bondholder, net of the value of the re-
structured bonds he may obtain. Hence, the protection seller on average breaks even and
can thus be ignored in the welfare analysis.
Proposition 9 shows that in the absence of strategic investors, any distribution of pro-
tection among bondholders forms an equilibrium.
Proposition 9 In the case of a continuum of non-strategic bondholders and no informa-
tional problems, each allocation of credit protection represents an equilibrium.
Proof. First consider the equilibrium in the absence of credit protection. Let si (0 <
si < 1) denote bondholder is share in the total number of (identical) bonds. We assume
that in order for a restructuring o¤er to be successful, the proportion of bonds for which
bondholders accept the o¤er should be at least h, where 0 < h < 1. We also assume
that, if all other bondholders accept or reject, no individual bondholder has enough bonds
21
to inuence the crisis outcome, i.e. si < 1   h and si < h for all i. This is consistent
with the existence of a collective action clause that prevents individual bondholders from
holding out in the hope of fully recovering their initial investment. For a restructuring o¤er
r, bondholder i now accepts if si  r  si  k or if r  k. The sovereign can only credibly
promise r  k if f  k. Hence, as in the case of one bondholder, there will be restructuring
with r = k when f  k and default when f < k.
Now consider the equilibrium with credit protection. First note that bondholders are
indi¤erent between di¤erent levels of credit protection. This is because of three reasons.
First, as before, they are risk-neutral and hence there is no value of buying protection per
se. Secondly, the price they pay for credit protection equals the expected net payments
they will receive from the protection seller. And thirdly, since each individual bondholder
cannot change the restructuring outcome, bondholders cannot (individually) use protection
strategically to improve their outside option in negotiations with the sovereign. Hence, a
bondholders expected payo¤ does not change with his level of credit protection, making
bondholders (individually) indi¤erent between all levels of protection.
The sovereigns restructuring o¤er will then depend on the distribution of the bondhold-
ersprotection level. An o¤er is now only successful if the proportion of bonds for which
bondholders accept is at least h. This condition is satised if the sovereign can credibly
promise r  qh + (1  qh)k, where qh is the (100  h)th percentile of the distribution of cho-
sen protection levels. Hence, there will be restructuring with r = qh + (1   qh)k whenever
f  qh + (1   qh)k or if qh  f k1 k , and default when qh > f k1 k . Since bondholders are
indi¤erent between di¤erent levels of protection, we have that any distribution of protection
with qh 2 [0; 1] represents an equilibrium.
Thus, whether credit protection is desirable is, per se, undetermined. In particular,
there may be outcomes where bondholders overprotect(for example, if all bondholders
choose a qi such that their outside option, qi+ (1  qi)k, becomes larger than f even when
f > k ).
However, as the next proposition shows, the equilibrium derived in Section 4 (Propo-
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sition 2), that is the equilibrium that maximizes bondholderspayo¤s, remains an equilib-
rium. Hence, if bondholders can coordinate in their choice of the equilibrium (that is, if we
rule out equilibria that are pareto-dominated among bondholders), we will obtain the same
equilibrium as in Proposition 2. In this case, as previously discussed, credit protection is
unambiguously welfare improving since it enhances the sovereigns ex-ante incentives.
Proposition 10 In the case of a continuum of non-strategic bondholders and no informa-
tional problems, the equilibrium derived in Proposition 2 above remains an equilibrium and
still maximizes the payo¤ of bondholders. In this equilibrium, there is restructuring with
r = f whenever f  k and default otherwise. Credit protection then works in the same way
as in the case of strategic bondholders. In particular, it does not change crisis resolution
but reduces moral hazard in crisis avoidance.
Proof. Suppose each bondholder buys protection q = f k
1 k when f  k and buys no
protection otherwise. In this case there will be restructuring with r = qh + (1   qh)k = f
when f  k and default otherwise. Hence, for each f the bondholders obtain the maximum
available payo¤ (f when f  k and k when f < k) and the introduction of protection
again does not change crisis resolution but reduces moral hazard in crisis avoidance. This
equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium with strategic investors derived in Proposition 2
above and summarized in Table 2. To see that this is still an equilibrium in the case of
non-strategic bondholders, note that an individual bondholder has no incentive to buy more
or less protection, as he does not have enough bonds to inuence the crisis outcome and
hence cannot change his payo¤s.
In Section 4 we have also shown that even though the availability of protection is
benecial, there is scope for government intervention as bondholders may not choose the
socially desirable level of protection. As the next proposition shows, there is still a similar
role for government intervention. However, while in Section 4 this role arose because crisis
resolution could be improved by forcing higher levels of protection (which then no longer
constituted an equilibrium), it now su¢ ces to have bondholders coordinating on these
higher levels (that is, the higher protection levels also constitute an equilibrium).
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Proposition 11 In the case of a continuum of non-strategic bondholders and no infor-
mational problems, the protection level that was derived to be optimal in terms of crisis
resolution in the presence of strategic bondholders (Proposition 3) still constitutes an equi-
librium and is still socially optimal in terms of crisis resolution. In this equilibrium, there
is restructuring with r = k whenever f + c  k and default otherwise.
Proof. Suppose each bondholder buys long protection qLP = c1 f and short protection
qLP =   c1 f . As in Proposition 3, protection now e¤ectively starts only in period 2.
Compared to the case of no protection, the bondholders payo¤ has only changed in that
under restructuring he now obtains qLP +(1  qLP )f = f + c when r > f . Hence, there will
be restructuring with r = k whenever f + c  k and default otherwise, implying that crisis
resolution is now e¢ cient. This equilibrium is identical to the allocation with strategic
investors derived in Proposition 3 above. To see that this is an equilibrium in the case of
non-strategic bondholders, note that an individual bondholder has no incentive to buy more
or less protection, as he does not have enough bonds to inuence the crisis outcome and
hence cannot change his payo¤s.
In the case of non-strategic investors, the ability to coordinate on good equilibria
hence becomes paramount. If coordination can be achieved, credit protection will still be
benecial. If not, e¢ cient crisis resolution can be undermined.
There is now an even greater role for public policy. Public policy can now avoid coordi-
nation on equilibria that are not preferred by bondholders (and hence are also undesirable
for ex-ante incentives). For example, the IMF may publicly announce desirable levels of
sovereign protection; or governments may issue bonds with the rightlevel of protection
attached to them. The IMF may also state that it intends to give preferential treatment
for bondholders that have chosen a certain range of protection in the case of a default (we
discuss the role for the IMF more explicitly in Section 6.4). Public policy can, moreover,
implement equilibria that improve upon crisis resolution itself. Arguably, such equilibria
are more di¢ cult to obtain as they are not preferred by bondholders themselves.
We have in the foregoing assumed that there are neither any direct costs nor benets
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for an investor from buying protection. The only e¤ect of protection arose through its
potential impact on crisis resolution. Suppose now that an (individual) investor has net
costs of  from buying protection (independently of crisis resolution). These costs may
be positive ( > 0) due to some deadweight loss from buying protection. For example,
the deadweight loss may be interpreted as arising from transaction costs for the investors,
or capital costs and administrative costs for the protection seller which cause the price
of protection to rise above its fair price.29 Arguably, the (net) costs may also be negative
( < 0). This is in the presence of some benets from buying protection, arising for example
due to bondholdersrisk-aversion.
The introduction of such costs (or benets) has profound implications for the equilib-
rium level of protection. Consider the case of  > 0. In this case, the only equilibrium is
for bondholders not to hold any protection. To see this, suppose that there is a bondholder
who plans to hold a positive level of protection. If he chooses instead not to do so, he
will get less payouts in states where the protection would otherwise have been triggered,
but he also does not have to pay the price of protection. Since the bondholder perceives
no inuence over the restructuring process and the price of protection, he will be strictly
better of doing so due to the deadweight loss from buying protection. In the presence of
net-benets, we have the opposite outcome: since bondholders perceive no inuence over
the restructuring process, they only take into account their direct gains from protection
and will hence choose to protect fully. Thus, we can have either underprotection or
overprotection, depending on the sign of bondholdersnet-costs.
It may be argued that credit derivatives markets will mature further in the foresee-
able future (once the current turmoil has abated). The costs of buying protection for
investors may hence fall over the longer term, thus making it more likely that investors
overall perceive net-benets from protection. If this is indeed the case, we may eventually
29Note that the results of the baseline model are robust to the introduction of such costs. This is
because in areas where there is restructuring, a bondholder makes a discrete positive gain from increasing
protection because he then extracts more from the sovereign. For su¢ ciently small , these gains will
always dominate the deadweight costs.
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expect overprotection to occur. The experience in other mature derivatives markets,
however, suggests that hedging ratios are typically small30, indicating that the costs of
buying protection remain su¢ ciently high.
6.2 Discipline through the Price of Protection
In our baseline model, the bondholder only refrains from buying excessive protection (that
is, protection that causes ine¢ cient defaults) because the price of protection jumps when
it exceeds a certain threshold. The reason for why there is a jump is that there is a single
output state and hence there is a critical level of protection below which there is always
acceptance, and above rejection. It would be more realistic, however, to presume that
there are many possible realizations of output. Then, when there is an increase in the
level of protection, there are some more states of the world (that is, realizations of output)
for which there is default. Protection then has to be triggered slightly more often. As
a result, the price of protection will raise gradually as the level of protection increases,
increasingly discouraging the bondholder from further purchases. Thus, the (admittedly)
extreme jump in the price is not necessary to provide discipline for the bondholder in order
to avoid ine¢ cient defaults.31
It is also not necessary that the bondholder is aware that the fair price of protection
changes as he increases his protection level. The reason is that the bondholder ultimately
has to buy a large amount of protection if he wants to inuence the restructuring outcome.
He will typically be unable to buy at once such an amount of protection in the market
at a reasonable price. In order to minimize the price impact of his trades he will hence
be forced to spread his purchases over time. But then also the price of protection will
30For example, Faulkender (2005) nds that rms hedge only 6.5% of their (xed rate) bond issuances
(and zero percent of their bank loans) through interest rate swaps.
31Note that there generally can not be an equilibrium with rational agents where a bondholder over-
protects(in the sense of causing ine¢ cient defaults). This would either imply that the protection seller
did not price protection correctly. Or, if he did price it correctly, the bondholder would be better o¤ by
not bying protection at all (as shown in the baseline model).
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raise over time, reecting the changed restructuring expectations in the market arising
from his higher protection level. Thus, even if the bondholder is myopic in the sense that
he is not anticipating the impact of his protection level on the fair price, discipline will
still be provided. Alternatively, the bondholder may try to purchase in a single, privately
negotiated, deal from a protection seller. But then the protection seller will raise his
o¤er price when the bondholders wants to purchase a large amount of protection, again
providing some discipline.
6.3 Coordination Problems in the Restructuring Process
For our baseline model we have presumed that there are no coordination problems among
bondholders during the restructuring process (at the beginning of this section we have
already discussed coordination problems in buying protection). Thus, the model can be
best thought of as being applicable in situations where there are institutions (such as
the presence of creditor committees, or restructuring through the Paris or London Club),
or contractual provisions (such as the adoption of collective action clauses, CACs) that
facilitate creditor coordination.32 However, our main results continue to hold if there are
coordination problems among creditors.
To see this, consider the baseline model of Section 3 but now assume that there are two
bondholders who each hold one sovereign bond (that is, each bondholders claim against
the sovereign is 1). This gives rise to the well-known holdout problem: a bondholder may
reject a restructuring o¤er in the hope of recovering a larger part of his claim, given that
the other bondholder has accepted. Because of this incentive to holdout, restructuring
o¤ers that would otherwise have been successful may now fall through, adding another
32Especially the use of CACs, which are designed to e¤ectively reduce coordination problems (e.g.
Haldane et. al., 2005), has increased substantially in recent years and is now the standard in international
sovereign bond markets. At the end of February 2006, the share of outstanding bonds including CACs was
already 60 percent, up from 40 percent three years earlier. In fact, most of the outstanding bonds without
CACs were issued before 2003 and since June 2005 only one country (Jamaica) issued an international
sovereign bond without CACs (IMF, 2006, Gelpern and Gulati, forthcoming 2007).
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bias towards default to the restructuring process.
More specically, assume that when one of the bondholders holds out (while the other
accepts the restructuring o¤er), he can recover an amount j of his claim, where we assume
k < j < min(1; 2k). First, the bondholder who holds out can thus secure a larger recovery
value (k < j) than the single bondholder in our baseline model because the other bond-
holder has accepted the restructuring o¤er and is therefore not competing for (part of )
the total liquidation value (which now equals 2k, given that the total claim now equals
2). Second, we assume that the bondholder cannot recover his full claim (j < 1). We
believe this assumption to be realistic given that the bondholder that holds out is on his
own and can for example not pool his recovery expenditures (e.g. litigation costs) with
other bondholders (in which case j can be thought of as 1 minus the costs of recovery). He
may also have a weak negotiating position, given that any peer pressure on the sovereign
to limit the losses of international investors will be small, since the other bondholder has
accepted the restructuring o¤er (in which case j represents the maximum that the bond-
holder can extract from the sovereign). Finally, the recovery value j cannot exceed the
total liquidation value, 2k.
Consider now a (credible) restructuring o¤er of r by the sovereign made (jointly) to
each bondholder. Even though one bondholder accepts the o¤er, the other bondholder
may decide not to accept and to holdout in order to obtain j. In order to avoid a default,
the sovereign thus has to o¤er r  j to the bondholders. Since the sovereign can at most
credibly promise f , there will be default when f < j. Such a default causes ine¢ ciencies
when f > 2k  c, that is when the total payo¤ of all parties under a restructuring is higher
than under a default.
An obvious concern is that the incidence of ine¢ cient defaults increases when a bond-
holder holds protection. The reason is that a bondholder is then (partially) insured for
the part of his claim that he cannot recover from the sovereign under default (1  j), but
not when he accepts the restructuring o¤er. More specically, a bondholders payo¤ (gross
of protection) under a level of (short) protection q in the case of holdout is j + (1   j)q,
while the payo¤ from accepting the restructuring o¤er is still r. Therefore, in order to
28
secure restructuring, a sovereign would need to o¤er r = j + (1  j)q to the bondholders.
This amount is increasing in the level of protection and may exceed f . In that sense, the
availability of credit protection seems to worsen the holdout problem.
But let us now consider the bondholdersincentives to buy protection. As long as the
sovereign can still achieve restructuring (that is when j + (1   j)q < f), the bondholder
unambiguously improves his position by buying more protection. This is because then
the restructuring o¤er has to increase, but protection, since never exercised, does not cost
anything (note that it does not matter who buys the protection, since both bondholders
benet from higher payouts). As a result, higher payo¤s are extracted from the sovereign
as long as there is still restructuring.
Can it be that the bondholder buys an amount of protection that makes restructuring
impossible, hence causing default? For a protection level q, his (gross) payo¤s from holding
out are j+(1 j)q. Protection then has to be exercised on the part of the claim that is not
recovered (1  j) and the costs of protection are hence (1  j)q. Thus, his net gains from
buying protection that leads to default are j. These net gains are independent of q and
in particular equal to the net gains when there is no protection. Hence, buying protection
does not increase his incentives to cause default. Summing up, protection has the same
e¤ect as in the baseline model: it reduces ex-ante moral hazard by allowing bondholders to
extract more from the sovereign but does not undermine the e¢ ciency of crisis resolution.
6.4 IMF bailouts
Our analysis so far has ignored the potential role of the IMF. In practice, the IMF frequently
bails out bondholders by providing loans to distressed countries. This a¤ects the unfolding
of a potential crisis itself (by avoiding it from the start), but, more importantly in our
context, may also have an e¤ect on the bondholders incentives to purchase protection.
We next extend our baseline model to allow for IMF bailouts and study their impli-
cations. We consider three di¤erent types of IMF intervention, depending on the timing
of the intervention. First, an IMF bailout could take place prior to any restructuring ne-
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gotiations between the sovereign and the bondholder. More specically, at the beginning
of period 1, when faced with a shortage of funds, the sovereign approaches the IMF for
support. The IMF provides support with probability  < 1 (we assume  < 1 because
if the IMF always bails out bondholders there is obviously no role for protection). The
support takes the form of a loan of size 1 to the sovereign, which the sovereign has to repay
in period 2. Thus, in the case in which the sovereign obtains IMF support, it can pay out
the bondholder in full and the crisis is averted. Any protection the bondholder may have
purchased is then not triggered. However, with probability 1   there is no support from
the IMF. The sovereign may then make a restructuring o¤er to the bondholder in order to
avoid a default, and events unfold as in the baseline model.
Secondly, an IMF bailout could take place in case of a failed restructuring o¤er only. In
this case, the IMF rst allows the restructuring negotiations to take place and then with
probability  < 1 provides the sovereign with a loan of size 1 (to be repaid in period 2)
in case of a failed restructuring to avoid the termination of the countrys project. Again,
if the IMF intervenes, the sovereign can fully repay the bondholder and carry on with the
project, while any protection the bondholder may have purchased is not exercised. But
with probability 1    there is no IMF intervention and the sovereign defaults, as in the
baseline model.
Finally, IMF intervention may not just be conditional on a failed restructuring but may
further be conned to failed restructurings in countries with high productivity projects
only. This is consistent with the argument that the IMF should only intervene in case of
(temporary) liquidity crises and not in case of solvency crises. The high and low states of
nature in section 5 above can be thought of as liquidity and solvency crises, respectively.
Hence, we extend the asymmetric information model in section 5 by allowing for IMF
bailouts. We assume that the IMF has the same (superior) information about the state of
nature as the sovereign and that with probability  < 1 it bails out the sovereign in case
of a failed restructuring and a high productivity of the countrys project.
Proposition 12 below shows that although the introduction of possible IMF bailouts in
our model reduces the e¤ect of protection on moral hazard in all three cases, it does not
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eliminate this e¤ect. Hence, also in the presence of possible IMF bailouts, bondholders
can use credit protection to extract higher payments from the sovereign, thereby reducing
ex-ante moral hazard.
Proposition 12 In the presence of IMF bailouts, credit protection still does not change
crisis resolution. It also continues to reduce moral hazard in crisis avoidance but to a
smaller extent than when IMF bailouts are absent.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
These models of IMF bailouts assume that the IMF support is independent of the
bondholders level of protection. The analysis may potentially be di¤erent if the IMF pays
out less when the bondholder is protected. The reason is that the bondholders incentive
to purchase protection is then reduced because it lowers the (implicit) subsidy he receives
from the IMF: the bondholder still has to pay for protection but protection now provides
less benets since the IMF may reduce its level of support accordingly. However, given the
nature of the credit derivatives markets, this is an unrealistic scenario for an IMF inter-
vention. It would require the IMF (and the sovereign who ultimately repays bondholders)
to know exactly how much protection a bondholder holds. Since credit protection can be
bought in decentralized (and anonymous) over-the-counter markets, there is little room for
the IMF or the sovereign to obtain this information (and the bondholder itself clearly has
no incentive to come forward with the fact that he has bought protection).
7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the implications of credit derivatives for sovereign debt crises.
We nd that in most cases they reduce debtor moral hazard by allowing a bondholder to
increase his outside option. Furthermore, credit derivatives do not reduce the e¢ ciency
of crisis resolution when protection is chosen strategically, as the bondholder internalizes
potential ine¢ ciencies through a higher price for protection. When the bondholder is
not fully informed about the future repayment abilities of the sovereign, they may even
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facilitate conditionality in crisis resolution.
However, there is a potential role for government policy. First, a bondholders optimal
strategic choice of protection is not always socially e¢ cient. This is, in particular, because
he does not internalize the countrys private benets from not having to go through a
default. Interestingly, the role for policy arises in this case because the bondholder does
not buy enoughprotection, either in terms of the extent or in the duration of protection.
As credit derivatives markets are decentralized, direct regulation is unlikely to be e¤ective.
However, sovereigns (or supranational organizations) may sponsor certain forms of protec-
tion (for example by subsidizing protection sellers). Alternatively, they may issue bonds
with protection attached to them which is guaranteed by a third party.
Second, levels of protection may not be e¢ cient when there are no bondholders that
choose protection for strategic reasons. Then, equilibria may arise where the protection
chosen by bondholders hinders e¢ cient crisis resolution, as feared by some policy makers.
However, there are also always equilibria in which there are no negative ex-post e¤ects
of credit derivatives. In the absence of strategic bondholders there is hence a strong role
for sovereign countries and/or supranational organizations in facilitating coordination on
socially desirable equilibria of credit protection.
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Appendix 1: Welfare
The sovereign chooses to incur the costs a at date 1 (and thus to avoid the crisis altogether)
i¤
PNCS + b  a > PCS
where PNCS and P
C
S are the sovereigns payo¤s (gross of b and a) in the absence of a crisis
and in a crisis, respectively. Hence, for appropriately dened amin and amax, there is a
cut-o¤ value a 2 [amin; amax] such that for a 2 [amin; a) the sovereign incurs the costs, while
for a 2 [a; amax] he does not, where a is given by
a := PNCS   PCS + b
Note that for any a the crisis is fully under the control of the sovereign. However, this
could be easily modied by assuming an upper limit on the size of the costs a the sovereign
can incur (for example, because of limited domestic tax capacity).
Denoting with D the amount of funds raised in period 0, we have that the bondholders
expected return has to be equal to D. This is because debt markets are competitive and
because there is no discounting (note that the agreed repayment will generally di¤er from
D since it also has to compensate the bondholder for expected losses in crises). This
condition can be written asZ a
amin
PNCB (a)da+
Z amax
a
PCB (a)da = D
where PNCB and P
C
B denote the bondholders payo¤s when there is no crisis and when there
is a crisis, respectively. It follows that
dPNCB =dP
C
B < 0
implying that a lower payo¤ for the bondholder in a crisis has to be compensated by a
higher payo¤ when there is no crisis.
Dene, furthermore, with PNC := PNCB + P
NC
S (= f) and P
C := PCB + P
C
S the joint
payo¤s for the sovereign and the bondholder. Since the bondholder breaks even on average
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we can ignore him in the welfare analysis. Welfare, W , is hence solely characterized by the
sovereigns expected utility, which consists of the sum of the joint payo¤s plus net benets
b   a when there is no crisis (a < a) and the joint payo¤s when there is a crisis (a  a),
minus the bondholders required return D
W =
Z a
amin
(PNC + b  a)(a)da+
Z amax
a
PC(a)da D
We show next that welfare in the economy is increasing in the joint payo¤ in a crisis PC
but decreasing in the sovereigns payo¤ in a crisis PCS . Totally di¤erentiating W (P
C ; P
C
S )
with respect to to PC (i.e., holding PCS constant) gives
dW (PC ; P
C
S )
dPC
=
@W
@PC
+
@W
@a
da
dPC
=
@W
@PC
+
@W
@a
@a
@PNCS
dPNCS
dPC
=
Z amax
a
(a)da+ (PNCB   PCB )(a)
@a
@PNCS
dPNCS
dPC
Since dPCB =dP
C = 1 for PCS = P
C
S we have thus dP
NC
S =dP
C = d(PNC   PNCB )=dPCB =
 dPNCB =dPCB > 0. From @a=@PNCS = 1 and PNCB   PCB  0 (i.e., in expectation, the
bondholders payo¤ when there is no crisis is at least as high as when there is a crisis), it
follows that dW (PC ; P
C
S )=dP
C > 0.
Totally di¤erentiating W (P
C
; PCS ) wrt. to P
C
S gives
dW (P
C
; PCS )
dPCS
=
@W
@PCS
+
@W
@a
da
dPCS
=
@W
@PCS
+
@W
@a

@a
@PNCS
dPNCS
dPCS
+
@a
@PCS

= 0 + (PNCB   PCB )(a)

dPNCS
dPCS
  1

< 0
where the inequality follows because of dPCB =dP
C
S =  1 for PC = P
C
we have dPNCS =dP
C
S =
d(PNC   PNCB )=d( PBS ) = dPNCB =dPCB < 0. Hence, welfare is increasing in PC and de-
creasing in PCS .
Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof. Proof of Proposition 5] Note rst that in the presence of protection there are only
pooling equilibria (the proof of Lemma 1 can be readily applied by replacing reference
to Proposition 1 with Proposition 2). Suppose that the bondholder buys an amount of
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short protection q such that his payo¤ under default becomes q + (1   q)k = ef (i.e.,
q = ( ef   k)=(1  k)) when ef  k and buys no protection (q = 0) otherwise. When ef  k
there is then acceptance with r = fH as this r makes the bondholders expected payo¤ from
acceptance just equal to his outside option: gmin(r; f) =gmin(fH ; f) = fH+(1 )fL = ef .
The bondholders net payo¤ is then ef as protection is not exercised. When ef < k there
is rejection as q = 0 (from Proposition 4) and the bondholders net payo¤ is k. Thus,
in each case the bondholder obtains the maximum available payo¤ available in a pooling
equilibrium: ef when ef  k and k when ef < k. q is therefore the bondholders optimal
protection. From the above we have then that equilibrium crisis resolution is unchanged.
However, the sovereigns payo¤ when ef  k is now only zero (for ef < k it is still  c).
Thus, when ef > k moral hazard is lowered.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 6] Suppose that the bondholder holds long protection with
qLP = c=[(1  )(1  fL)] > 0 and short protection with qSP =  qLP . Since qSP =  qLP ,
the bondholder is not protected in period 1. The bondholders payo¤ from default is
thus k under default. A restructuring o¤er of r = fHgives the bondholder a return of
fH in the high state and max(fL; qLP + (1   qLP )fL) = qLP + (1   qLP )fL in the low
state (as then r > fL and he can exercise his protection). Hence his expected return
is fH + (1   )(qLP + (1   qLP )fL) = ef + c. Analogous to Proposition 4 it follows
that there is restructuring whenever ef + c  k and default otherwise, implying that crisis
resolution is improved whenever k > ef  k   c. However, the sovereigns payo¤ (and thus
moral hazard) increases compared to the bondholders optimal protection. This is because
the joint payo¤s of the sovereign and the bondholder have increased (as crisis resolution
becomes more e¢ cient) but the bondholders payo¤ has not increased (otherwise, the
bondholders optimal protection would not maximize his payo¤s).
Proof. Proof of Proposition 7] Assume (i) k = l, (ii) fL  fH   (k   c) and (iii)
k   c > 0. Note that (i) implies that litigation is credible for q = 0 but not for q > 0.
Consider short protection with q = fH   (k   c) , which is larger than zero by (ii). Hence
the litigation threat is uncredible. The conditions (i)-(iii) from Lemma 2 are then fullled.
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Therefore, we have a separating equilibrium with r = q = fH   (k   c) in the high state
and default in the low state. The bondholders net expected payo¤ is q = (fH   (k  c))
as q = fH   (k   c) is the payout that the sovereign makes in the high state, while there
is no payout in the low state (note that this is also the maximum expected payo¤ the
bondholder can achieve in a separating equilibrium as he has to guarantee the sovereign
at least k   c in the high state in order not to make the sovereign default).
Pooling equilibria can only obtain for levels of protection which do not fulll condition
(i) or (ii) in Lemma 2. There are three cases to consider: a) q > fH (k c), b) 0 < q < fL
and c) q = 0. Under a) litigation is uncredible. In order to achieve restructuring in a
pooling, the sovereign would have to promise an expected return of q to the bondholder,
thus making the sovereigns payo¤ under restructuring min(fH   q; 0) < k   c in the high
state and min(fL   q; 0) = 0 in the low state. These payo¤s are smaller than the payo¤
under rejection k   c > 0. Thus, the sovereign prefers rejection, making the bondholders
net payo¤ zero as then there is no payout at all. Under b) litigation is also uncredible. If
there is rejection, the bondholders payo¤ is still zero, while if there is (pooling) acceptance,
the bondholders net payo¤ is q. Hence the bondholders payo¤ is at most fL as q < fL.
Under c) litigation costs play no role and we can use Proposition 4 to obtain that the
bondholders net payo¤ is k. Hence, since 0 < fL < k, the bondholder would choose case
c) (q = 0) in a pooling. As shown above, a bondholder can secure himself (fH (k c)) in
a separating equilibrium. Thus, the bondholder chooses a separating equilibrium whenever
(fH   (k   c))  k, which can be fullled, for example, for su¢ ciently large fH .
Proof. Proof of Proposition 8] Assume that conditions (i)-(iii) in the proof of Proposi-
tion 7 hold and that (fH   (k   c)) < k, i.e., the bondholders net payo¤ in a separating
equilibrium is less than in a pooling equilibrium (from Proposition 7). The bondholder
hence chooses pooling. Assume furthermore that ef < k. Recalling that the bondholder
chooses q = 0 under pooling, it follows from Proposition 4 that there is default under
pooling; hence the joint net payo¤s of the bondholder and the sovereign are k   c. By
contrast, the joint payo¤ in a separating equilibrium is fH+(1 )(k c), which is larger
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than k  c by fH > k. Thus, although the bondholder chooses a pooling equilibrium, crisis
resolution is more e¢ cient in a separating equilibrium.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 12] (1) IMF bailout prior to restructuring: When
there is a bailout, the bondholders payo¤ (gross of protection) is 1, and hence independent
of his protection level. When there is no bailout, the restructuring outcome (for a given
level of protection) is precisely the same as in the baseline model. This implies, rst, that
the bondholders payo¤ in this situation is the same as in the baseline model. Second,
it also implies that the price of protection is a fraction 1    of the price in the baseline
model, since only with probability 1    the sovereign ultimately has a lack of funds. It
follows that both the benets of protection and the costs of protection are reduced by a
factor 1   , compared to the baseline model. Therefore, the bondholder faces the same
optimization problem as in the baseline model and the restructuring outcome hence will
not change. However, the bondholder can now only extract higher payments from the
sovereign (through the use of protection) with probability 1  . Therefore, the impact of
protection on the sovereigns payo¤s is lower and moral hazard is less mitigated. (2) IMF
bailout in case of failed restructuring only: When there is a bailout, the IMF lends 1
to the sovereign, the bondholder is fully repaid and the sovereigns payo¤ is max(f   1; 0).
Hence, the sovereigns expected payo¤under default is max(f 1; 0) (1 )c, while it is
still max(f r; 0) under restructuring. The sovereign will still always prefer restructuring if
f < 1+ 1 

c (this condition obtains when he o¤ers the maximum credible amount, r = f).
First consider the case where this holds. Given that the bondholders payo¤ under default
is now +(1 )k, the sovereign needs to credibly promise a return of +(1 )k to obtain
restructuring. When f  +(1 )k, this is feasible and hence there is restructuring with
 + (1   )k. When f <  + (1   )k, there is default. Since  + (1   )k > k, there
are more defaults than in the baseline model (see Proposition 2). Now suppose again
that the bondholder buys protection q such that  + (1   )(q + (1   q)k) = f when
f   + (1  )k and buys no protection otherwise. When f   + (1  )k there is thus
acceptance with r = f , while for f <  + (1   )k there is default. Hence, as before, for
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each f the bondholder obtains the maximum available payo¤: f when f  +(1 )k and
+(1 )k when f < +(1 )k. And again protection does not change crisis resolution.
Since the sovereigns payo¤ when f   + (1  )k is now zero (when f < + (1  )k it
is still max(f   1; 0)   (1   )c), protection again lowers moral hazard. However, while
in the baseline model protection reduced the sovereigns payo¤ under restructuring from
f   k to 0, it now reduces the sovereigns payo¤ from f   (+ (1  )k) to 0. Hence, the
decrease in the sovereigns payo¤ is smaller and moral hazard is thus reduced to a lesser
extent. Next consider the case where f > 1 + 1 

c. The sovereigns payo¤ under default
is now (f   1)   (1   )c > 0. Given that the sovereigns payo¤ under default is now
positive, the bondholder can no longer extract the maximum available payo¤ f from the
sovereign. The reason is that for a restructuring o¤er r = f , the sovereigns payo¤ under
restructuring is 0 and hence the sovereign will now prefer default. In order for the sovereign
to prefer restructuring, its payo¤under restructuring max(f r; 0) should exceed its payo¤
under default (f 1)  (1 )c (> 0). Hence, the bondholders optimal level of protection
should now be such that f   r  (f   1)  (1  )c, where r = +(1  )(q+(1  q)k).
This condition is satised for r  (1 )(f+c)+ (< f). Thus, there will be restructuring
with r = (1 )(f+c)+ < f . Given that f > 1+ 1 

c > +(1 )k, there will always be
restructuring, as in the baseline model for these values of f . Concluding, for f > 1 + 1 

c
protection does not change crisis resolution and again reduces moral hazard to a lesser
extent than in the baseline model. In fact, the reduction of moral hazard is smaller than
for other values of f , since the bondholder can no longer extract the maximum available
payo¤ f . (3) IMF bailout in case of failed restructuring with high productivity
only: In this case the IMF only bails out in case of a failed restructuring and a high
productivity of the project. The prior probability of being in the high state and being
bailed out is . As under (2) above, the possibility of a bailout increases the bondholders
outside option and therefore increases the incidence of defaults. Protection does not alter
crisis resolution and can still be used to extract a higher payment from the sovereign and
thus reduce moral hazard, although to a lesser extent than in the baseline model.33
33To save space, we do not report formal proofs of this case. They are available upon request.
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